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LABOR LAw-ARBITRATION-PowER oF ARBITRATOR To ENJOIN UNION 
FROM CONTINUING SLOWDOWN-An arbitrator, acting under a collective 
bargaining agreement which called for a "speedy arbitration" procedure,1 
issued an award enjoining the unions from continuing a slowdown in 
violation of that clause of the agreement forbidding strikes, lockouts, and 
slowdowns. A Supreme Court order granted the employers' motion to 
confirm the award and overruled the unions' cross motion to vacate.2 
The unions claimed that the arbitrator, in issuing the injunction, had 
exceeded the powers granted him under the agreement and had acted 
contrary to section 876a of the Civil Practice Act (the New York Anti-
Injunction Act).3 The Appellate Division affirmed the order with minor 
modifications of form.4 On appeal, held, affirmed. The award of an in-
junction was proper since nothing short of this would have accomplished 
the intent of the parties that there be expeditious and immediately effective 
relief. Nor does section 876a bar an injunction as part of an arbitration 
award if the bargaining agreement contemplated its inclusion. Matter of 
Ruppert, 3 N.Y. (2d) 576, 148 N.E. (2d) 129 (1958). 
Today, with arbitration provisions contained in almost all collective 
bargaining agreements,5 the question how far an arbitrator's power ex-
tends has been productive of much speculation.6 Arbitrators have employed 
1 Under this clause either party could waive other adjustment procedures embodied 
in the contract and submit the dispute directly to arbitration. The arbitrator was required 
to schedule a hearing within 24 hours and to issue a decision not later than 48 hours 
after the conclusion of the hearing. 
2 Matter of Ruppert, 2 Misc. (2d) 744 (1956). 
a New York Civil Practice Act (Cahill-Parsons 1955) §876a provides that, except under 
certain very restricted conditions, "no court nor any judge or judges thereof shall have 
jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction involving 
or growing out of a labor dispute .... " 
4 Matter of Ruppert, 2 App. Div. (2d) 670 (1956). 
5 Over 90% of the estimated 100,000 collective agreements currently in effect provide 
for arbitration as the terminal step in grievance procedure. See Davey, "The Proper 
Uses of Arbitration," 9 LAB. L.J. 119 at 121 (1958). 
6 See in this connection Shulman, "Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations," 
68 HARv. L. REv. 999 at 1009 (1955). 
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a wide range of remedies in their awards, including damages, 7 liquidated 
damages,8 penalties,9 mandatory injunctions,10 and in at least one other 
case a restraining injunction similar to that of the principal case.11 New 
York, beginning with its pioneering statute of 1920, has been a leader 
in the encouragement of arbitration12 and allows the arbitrator a great 
amount of freedom. New York courts will vacate an award only upon 
certain limited grounds, principal among these being lack of jurisdiction.13 
Nevertheless, in the instant case the court conceded it could find no 
previous decision wherein it had confirmed an award containing a restrain-
ing injunction. However, it reaffirmed the doctrine that an arbitrator's 
jurisdiction is defined by the arbitration contract and that such agree-
ments are to be construed, like other contracts, to give effect to the intent 
of the parties.14 From this it was reasoned that inclusion of the "speedy 
arbitration" provision indicated an evident intent that there be rapid and 
immediately effective relief, concluding that nothing short of an injunc-
tion would have accomplished that intent. The court cited no precedent 
for this conclusion. Nor did it analyze likely alternative interpretations, 
such as the possibilities that the parties meant to authorize only an in-
terpretation of the contract or the immediate issuance of an award in-
dicating whether or not a contract violation existed. Such possible inter-
pretations appear relatively persuasive when the intent of the parties 
is viewed against the background of labor's longstanding and vociferous 
antipathy toward injunctions.15 In light of this history it would seem 
7 International Harvester (Illinois), 9 LAB. ARB. REP. 894 (1947); In re Phillips Chem-
cal Co. (Texas), 17 LAB. ARB. REP. 721 (1951). 
s Matter of Mencher, 276 App. Div. 556 (1950). 
9 Matter of East India Trading Co., 305 N.Y. 866, 114 N.E. (2d) 213 (1953). 
10 Matter of Devery, 292 N.Y. 596, 55 N.E. (2d) 370 (1944); Matter of United Bar &: 
Grill Employees, 299 N.Y. 577, 86 N.E. (2d) 104 (1949). 
11 Wholesale Laundry Board of Trade v. Tarrullo, 103 N.Y.S. (2d) 23 (1951). 
12 Other states which have adopted a similar attitude include New Jersey, Massachu-
setts, Oregon, California, Louisiana, Pennsylvania, Arizona, Connecticut, New Hampshire, 
Rhode Island, Wisconsin, Ohio, Michigan and Vvashington. These "reform states" fol-
lowed generally the 1920 New York arbitration law under which agreements to submit 
to arbitration future disputes arising out of the contracts containing such agreements were 
made legally valid, enforceable and irrevocable except as any other contract is revocable. 
The statute also closed the courts to parties to arbitration agreements until they had 
complied with their contracts and authorized the courts to help the parties expedite 
arbitration in various ways. See generally KELLOR, ARBITRATION AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
38-39 (1952). 
13 "The award of an arbitrator cannot be set aside for mere errors of judgment, 
either as to law or as to facts. If he keeps within his jurisdiction, and is not guilty of 
fraud, corruption, or other misconduct affecting his award, it is unassailable." Matter of 
Wilkins, 169 N.Y. 494 at 496, 62 N.E. 575 (1902); Matter of Pine St. Realty Co. v. 
Coutroulos, 233 App. Div. 404 (1931). 
14 Dodds v. Hakes, 114 N.Y. 260 at 265, 21 N.E. 398 (1889); Matter of Marchand v. 
Mead Morrisson Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929). 
15 See generally FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930). 
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that an express provision for injunction would be required to establish an 
intent, insofar as the union is concerned, to authorize injunctive relief. 
Having held that the parties intended the awarding of an injunction, 
the court was confronted by section 876a of the Civil Practice Act which 
was claimed by the union to deprive the arbitrator of jurisdiction despite 
any contrary intent of the parties.16 By interpreting this provision as 
inapplicable to an injunction which, while judicially enforced, is issued 
initially by an arbitrator, the court avoided a clash between the statute 
and the public policy of encouraging arbitration contracts. It reasoned that 
since the questioned legislation was the result of union resentment against 
the use of injunctions in labor disputes and since the union voluntarily 
subjects itself to arbitration, the parties should have power to authorize 
an award of injunctive relief by the arbitrator. The willingness in this case 
to let the parties' agreement control, necessitating as it did a narrow 
interpretation of section 876a, seems a definite extension of the New 
York policy to encourage arbitration. Although the decision is signifi-
cant in its enhancement of the effectiveness of the arbitrator, the danger 
is that it may cause labor to reassess its present acceptance of arbitration as a 
substitute for economic coercion. The real impact of the principal case 
will, however, probably be limited for two reasons. First, the decision 
reached was apparently dependent upon the contract provision calling 
for "speedy" arbitration, a phrase not likely to be found in many agree-
ments. Second, the result of this case can be effectively avoided by the 
insertion in a contract of a simple phrase expressly negating any intention 
to give the arbitrator power to award injunctive relief. 
Lawrence M. Kelly 
16 See note 3 supra. 
